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I. INTRODUCTION**
It is fitting and proper that Duquesne Law Review should honor
Chief Justice Ralph J. Cappy upon his retirement from public life
after thirty years of devoted service. The Chiefs sudden and un-
timely passing on May 1, 2009, renders this a bittersweet work
indeed. Contributors to this volume undoubtedly will recount
their experiences with the Chief during his tenure as Public De-
fender, Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
or Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. I will comment
briefly on the human side of the man.
Chief Justice Cappy possessed an indomitable spirit and made
an unforgettable first impression. Always generous with his time
and talent, the Chief was quick to help others from all walks of
life. While holding the highest judicial office in the Common-
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
** The author gratefully acknowledges his law clerk, Justine Kasznica, whose assis-
tance was essential to the development and creation of this article.
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wealth, he regularly took time from his busy schedule to meet
with scores of lawyers across Pennsylvania, from the most power-
ful and renowned to the inexperienced and unknown. He served
for years as a trustee of his alma mater, the University of Pitts-
burgh, and on the Board of the University of Pittsburgh Medical
Center.
The Chief's humanity and capacious desire to help others was
imbued in him at a very young age. He grew up in a consum-
mately Pittsburgh ethnic family (Serbian on his mother's side and
Italian on his father's), and the Brookline neighborhood where he
was raised was steeped in family and community. His father, Jo-
seph Cappy, spent his entire adult life as a public servant, work-
ing as a clerk to the Allegheny County Board of Viewers. Watch-
ing his father serve the people inspired the Chief to become edu-
cated and pursue a life of service in his own right. One can only
imagine the pride Joseph Cappy felt when, in January 2003, he
watched his son invested as Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court.
Notwithstanding his professional success, Ralph Cappy always
remembered from whence he came, the first in his lineage to re-
ceive a college diploma. Refusing to succumb to the myth of the
self-made man, he consistently honored his mentors by paying
forward the favor to those who followed him. Innumerable people
from all walks of life have benefitted from the Chiefs counsel and
generosity. His legacy will endure not only in law books, but also
in the hearts and minds of the people he has helped and inspired.
II. NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
Among Chief Justice Cappy's many contributions to the corpus
of Pennsylvania law, his opinion in Commonwealth v. Edmunds1
is perhaps preeminent. Written during Justice Cappy's second
year on the Supreme Court, Edmunds was a watershed in state
constitutional law because it articulated a standard for state
courts to follow as they determined whether to interpret their
state constitutions differently than federal courts interpreted the
United States Constitution. This article traces Pennsylvania law
since Edmunds and evaluates its impact nationwide.
Judges and academicians have long paid lip service to the prin-
ciple that states can interpret and apply their constitutions inde-
1. 586A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991).
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pendent of the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of
analogous provisions in the United States Constitution. As Jus-
tice Brandeis noted in 1932: "It is one of the happy incidents of
the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citi-
zens choose, serve as a laboratory[.] ' 2 This principle saw little
practical application, however, until it returned to the fore in the
1970s and 1980s.
Indeed, this so-called "new judicial federalism"'3 became one of
the hallmarks of the Supreme Court during the tenure of Chief
Justice Warren Burger. During this period in American legal his-
tory, Supreme Court justices began to remind the states of their
power to interpret their constitutions more broadly than the Su-
preme Court interpreted the United States Constitution.4 Despite
these not-so-subtle hints, initially only a handful of states ac-
cepted the invitation. Those few "courageous" state supreme
courts that exercised this power did so largely in the area of
criminal law.5 In time, state courts began experimenting with
new federalism with increasing confidence; between 1970 and
1989, approximately 600 published opinions interpreted state con-
stitutions more expansively than the United States Constitution. 6
This substantial increase in cases dealing with new federalism
was no accident, and it is best understood in its historical context.
In what has been called a "criminal procedure revolution," the
United States Supreme Court under the leadership of Chief Jus-
tice Earl Warren issued a series of decisions that expanded the
scope of constitutional protections afforded to defendants, most
notably in arrest and search and seizure cases. 7 Chief Justice
Warren was subsequently replaced by Chief Justice Burger in
1969, during a time of rapidly increasing crime. In 1971, Presi-
2. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
3. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., reintroduced the principle of independent state
constitutional interpretation as "new judicial federalism" at a lecture given at Harvard Law
School in 1977. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individ-
ual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
4. Id.; see also Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 375-76 (1972) (Powell, J., concur-
ring); Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Sandra Day O'Connor,
Our Judicial Federalism, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1984-1985).
5. For a thorough survey of state criminal case law that extended constitutional rights
beyond the federal minimum, see Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Consti-
tutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141 (1985).
6. Linda B. Matarese, Other Voices: The Role of Justices Durham, Kaye and Abra-
hamson in Shaping the "New Judicial Federalism," 2 EMERGING ISSUES IN STATE CONST. L.
239, 246 (1989).




dent Richard Nixon launched the "war on drugs," a national ini-
tiative that brought with it laws and policies intended to discour-
age the production, distribution, and consumption of illegal
drugs.8
Federal jurisprudence under the leadership of Chief Justice
Burger reflected the mood of the people nationally. As crime rates
continued to increase and the national outcry for reform grew
louder, the Burger Court transformed the criminal-procedure ju-
risprudence of the Warren Court by issuing decisions that facili-
tated criminal prosecutions. This tectonic shift in constitutional
criminal procedure was vilified by civil libertarians.9 Equally con-
cerned, many state court judges and academicians responded by
turning to state constitutional law, which ushered in the era of
modern judicial federalism.
As the Burger Court began to retreat from some of the protec-
tions granted to criminal defendants by the Warren Court, some
state supreme courts viewed this retreat as an opportunity to re-
spond. 10 They did so by using state constitutional law to protect
and enforce individual rights. As one commentator had noted:
"[A] sustained, systemic reaction against the Court, in retrospect,
look[ed] inevitable."11
Today, the power of the states to interpret their constitutions to
offer broader protection of individual rights than that required by
the United States Constitution is undisputed.1 2 Last term, writ-
ing for a nearly unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Scalia wrote,
8. See generally Steven B. Duke & Albert Gross, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR (1982).
9. See, e.g., Alpheus Thomas Mason, Whence and Whither the Burger Court? Judicial
Self-Restraint: A Beguiling Myth, 41 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS 1, 3-37 (1979); Bernard
Schwartz, THE ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM: THE BURGER COURT IN ACTION (1990); Charles M.
Lamb and Stephen C. Halpern, eds., THE BURGER COURT: POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PROFILES
(1991).
10. Ronald F. Wright, How the Supreme Court Delivers Fire and Ice to State Criminal
Justice, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1430 (2002).
11. Darryl K. Brown, The Warren Court, Criminal Procedure Reform, and Retributive
Punishment, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1411, 1413 (2002).
12. See, e.g., Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Process, 24 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 169, 190 (1983) (urging state courts "to develop truly independent state constitutional
jurisprudence"); Peter J. Galie, State Supreme Courts, Judicial Federalism and the Other
Constitutions, 71 JUDICATURE 100 (1987); Judith S. Kaye, A Midpoint Perspective on Direc-
tions in State Constitutional Law, 1 EMERGING ISSUES IN STATE CONST. L. 17 (1988); Robert
F. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on Federal Consti-
tutional Issues when Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63 TEX. L. REV.
1025, 1050 (1985); Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., First Things Last: Amendomania and State Bills
of Rights, 54 MISS. L. REV. 233, 257 (1984) (championing the state court protection of indi-
vidual rights); Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights,
95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1498 (1982); Martha Craig Daughtrey, State Court Activism and
Other Symptoms of the New Federalism, 45 TENN. L. REV. 731, 736 (1978).
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"Individual States may surely construe their own constitutions as
imposing more stringent constraints on police conduct than does
the Federal Constitution."'13 Although the power of the states to
do so is indisputable, questions remain as to when and how state
courts should exercise this power. 14 Whatever the future may
bring for judicial federalism, one thing is clear: The emergence of
"new judicial federalism" and the burgeoning case law and com-
mentary on the subject has won for state constitutional law a
rightful place next to the extensive body of scholarship regarding
federal law.
III. NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM IN PENNSYLVANIA
A. The Foundation for Edmunds: Commonwealth v. Sell
Pennsylvania was one of the early states to exercise its power to
expand individual rights beyond the minimum requirements of
the United States Constitution. 15 Most significant in this regard
is Commonwealth v. Sell,16 which laid the foundation for Ed-
munds. In Sell, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had to decide
whether to follow the United States Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Salvucci,17 which held that a defendant charged
with a possessory crime no longer had "automatic standing" to
challenge the lawfulness of a search and seizure, regardless of
whether it affected him. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court chose
13. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. _, _, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 1604 (April 23, 2008) (citing
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988)). In Moore, the Supreme Court considered
whether a police officer violated the Fourth Amendment by making an arrest based on
probable cause but in violation of state law. The court concluded that the search was rea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment because litigants had brought the claim on federal
grounds (not state constitutional grounds) and state law did not alter the Fourth Amend-
ment.
14. The criticism often levied is that states will abuse the power by availing themselves
of independent state constitutional interpretation whenever they wish to negate Supreme
Court decisions with which they disagree or deem "unsatisfactory." Paul Bator, The State
Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 606 n.1 (1981);
see also Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
15. See Commonwealth v. Richman, 320 A.2d 351 (Pa. 1974); Commonwealth v. Cam-
pana, 304 A.2d 432 (Pa. 1973), vacated, 414 U.S. 808 (1973), on remand, 314 A.2d 854 (Pa.
1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974); Commonwealth v. Triplett, 341 A.2d 62 (Pa. 1975);
Commonwealth v. Bussey, 404 A.2d 1309 (Pa. 1979); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d
1283 (Pa. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980); Commonwealth v. Sell, 470 A.2d 457
(Pa. 1983).
16. 470 A.2d 457 (Pa. 1983).
17. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
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not to apply the United States Supreme Court's analysis in Sal-
vucci to the Pennsylvania Constitution. 18
Writing for the majority, Justice Robert N. C. Nix, Jr., recog-
nized that "[w]hile minimum federal constitutional guarantees are
'equally applicable to the [analogous] state constitutional provi-
sions,' the state has the power to provide broader standards than
those mandated by the federal Constitution."'19 He noted that
"constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures existed in Pennsylvania more than a decade before the
adoption of the federal Constitution, and fifteen years prior to the
promulgation of the Fourth Amendment[.]" 20  Justice Nix con-
cluded that individuals charged with possessory offenses had
automatic standing to bring a suppression motion under the
Pennsylvania Constitution.21 Sell also recognized that "Article I,
[S]ection 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution... mandates greater
recognition of the need for protection from illegal governmental
conduct offensive to the right of privacy."22 Consequently, Sell
made clear that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would accord as
much weight to Supreme Court interpretations of the United
States Constitution as it accorded to the decisions of sister state
courts or lower federal courts, depending upon the persuasiveness
of the opinion.2
3
The Sell majority's departure from Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence did not go uncriticized. Justice McDermott (joined by
Justice Hutchinson) dissented sharply, claiming that this depar-
ture was unwarranted and dangerous. 24 According to the dissent,
when there is no discernible textual distinction between the Penn-
sylvania and United States constitutions, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court should adopt the reasoning of the United States Su-
preme Court.25 Justice McDermott opined that "absent compelling
reason, textual or otherwise . . . the interests of this nation are
best served by maintaining common standards of constitutional
law throughout its separate jurisdictions." 26
18. Sell, 470 A.2d at 458.
19. Id. at 466-67.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 467-68.
22. Id. at 468-69.
23. Sell, 470 A.2d at 467 (relying on DeJohn, 403 A.2d at 1288).
24. Id. at 469.




The divergent opinions in Sell exemplify the contrasting posi-
tions in an ongoing national debate concerning new judicial feder-
alism: Proponents champion the notion of the states as laborato-
ries of justice and the need for independent interpretation of state
constitutions to secure liberty, while critics believe that federal
standards should be respected because disparate state standards
will lead to unpredictable and chaotic results.
A survey of Pennsylvania cases involving new judicial federal-
ism following Sell reveals a continuation of that same debate.
Some Pennsylvania judges sided with the position taken by the
Sell majority and extended state constitutional protections to in-
dividuals beyond the federal standard. 27 Others were more cau-
tious in embracing Pennsylvania's foray into new judicial federal-
ism and sided with the position taken by the dissenters in Sell-
that judges should presume that state constitutional provisions
should be interpreted like their federal counterparts unless a
compelling reason existed to do otherwise.
28
B. The Edmunds Decision
After years of relative quiet, the debate in Sell was rekindled
eight years later in Commonwealth v. Edmunds.29 In Edmunds,
after just one year on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Justice
Cappy effectuated a sea change in Pennsylvania constitutional
law by abandoning the Sell presumption and replacing it with a
four-part framework for courts to use in evaluating claims arising
under the Pennsylvania Constitution.30
27. See, e.g., DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283 (recognizing an expectation of privacy in bank
records under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, notwithstanding the
Supreme Court's refusal to recognize any expectation of privacy in bank records under the
Fourth Amendment); Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 535 A.2d 1035, 1043 (Pa. 1987); Bussey,
404 A.2d 1309; Triplett, 341 A.2d 62; Richman, 320 A.2d 351; Campana, 304 A.2d 432.
28. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gray, 503 A.2d 921, 926 (Pa. 1985) (stating that an
expansion of rights under the State Constitution over applicable federal rights will only be
found where there is "a compelling reason to do so"); Commonwealth v. Johnston, 530 A.2d
74, 83 (Pa. 1987) (Hutchinson, J., dissenting) (majority held that a "canine sniff' constitutes
a search under the Pennsylvania Constitution; Justice Hutchinson disagreed, finding that
there was insufficient reason to depart from the federal standard); Commonwealth v. Sam,
952 A.2d 565 (Pa. 2008) (writing for the majority, Chief Justice Castille held that the Penn-
sylvania Constitution does not provide a greater right for a mentally incompetent inmate to
refuse antipsychotic medication for the purpose of rendering the inmate competent to par-
ticipate in post-sentencing proceedings than did the parallel federal right); Commonwealth
v. Harper, 611 A.2d 1211 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Commonwealth v. Crouse, 729 A.2d 588 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1999); Commonwealth v. Grahame, No. 3288 EDA 2006, 2008 WL 1759257 (Pa.
Super. Ct. Apr. 18, 2008).
29. 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991).




On August 4, 1985, Pennsylvania State Trooper Michael Deise
received a phone call from two men who had been hunting in a
remote, wooded area. 31 Asking to remain anonymous, the hunters
told Trooper Deise that they had come upon a white corrugated
building where marijuana plants were growing. 32 During a subse-
quent meeting,3 3 the hunters described the building in detail and
said that it was owned by Louis Edmunds. 34 Trooper Deise then
questioned the hunters about their ability to recognize marijuana
plants.35 Satisfied that the men could identify marijuana, Trooper
Deise investigated the area the next day by helicopter and located
a building that matched the hunters' description. 36 He later drove
past the property and found a mailbox that identified it as the
Edmunds residence.
37
After investigating the property by air and by foot, Trooper De-
ise applied to the local district judge for a search warrant based
upon his affidavit that disclosed the substance of the hunters' dis-
covery and the actions he had taken to confirm their story.
38
Trooper Deise's affidavit inadvertently omitted the specific date
and time that the hunters came upon the marijuana, however.
39
Despite this material omission, the district judge issued a warrant
to search the Edmunds residence, as well as the white corrugated
building described by the hunters.
40
Trooper Deise and several other state police officers executed
the warrant at the Edmunds residence. 41 Trooper Deise entered
the house while Louis Edmunds searched for the written lease to
the white corrugated building.42 At the top of the stairs, Trooper
Deise saw four bags containing what he believed to be mari-
juana. 43 The police officers then searched the white corrugated
31. Id. at 888-89.
32. Id. at 889.
33. Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 541 A.2d 368, 369 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), overruled by
Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887.
34. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 889. See also Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 541 A.2d 368,
369 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), overruled by Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887.




39. Id. at 890.






building and, consistent with the hunters' story, found a substan-
tial amount of marijuana within and around the premises.44 Ed-
munds was arrested, charged, and found guilty of possession of
marijuana and other related offenses.
45
2. Procedural History
Edmunds filed a pretrial motion to suppress the marijuana, ar-
guing that it was discovered and seized in violation of Article I,
Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution because Trooper De-
ise's affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause to sup-
port a search warrant. 46 Edmunds claimed that the affidavit was
fatally flawed because it failed to specify the date and time that
the hunters first discovered the marijuana plants, and because the
facts on which Trooper Deise relied were insufficient to show that
the hunters' testimony was reliable. 47 The trial court agreed that
the affidavit was defective under Pennsylvania law, but it applied
the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule established by
the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon48 and
concluded that the defective affidavit did not compel the suppres-
sion of evidence.
49
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the judg-
ment of the trial court. 50 It noted that Article I, Section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution contained language that was "the same
as that of the Fourth Amendment" and concluded there was no
compelling reason to deviate from the federal standard. 51 Accord-
ingly, the Superior Court also relied on Leon to conclude that "the
marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by suppressing evi-
dence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subse-
quently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial
costs of exclusion. 52
44. Id.
45. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 889-90.
46. Id.
47. A warrant issued without reference to the time when an informant had obtained his
information is defective under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Com-
monwealth v. Conner, 305 A.2d 341 (Pa. 1973).
48. 468 U.S. 897, 922-23 (1984) (holding that where an officer seizes evidence in good
faith reliance on a warrant that is later invalidated, that evidence is not subject to the
exclusionary rule).
49. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 890.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 895 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23).
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3. Edmunds and the Four-Part Interpretive Framework
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
Superior Court, holding that the "good faith" exception to the ex-
clusionary rule established in Leon does not apply to Article I, Sec-
tion 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 53 Therefore, evidence
seized in reliance on the deficient warrant was suppressed.
54
Although it signaled a clear departure from Leon, the Edmunds
holding was not as jurisprudentially significant as the four-part
test it established for reviewing claims brought under the Penn-
sylvania Constitution. In light of the United States Supreme
Court's requirement that state courts make a "plain statement" of
any adequate and independent state grounds upon which their
decisions rest, 55 Justice Cappy wrote:
... as a general rule it is important that litigants brief and
analyze at least the following four factors:
1) text of the Pennsylvania constitutional provision;
2) history of the provision, including Pennsylvania case-
law;
3) related case-law from other states;
4) policy considerations, including unique issues of state
and local concern, and applicability within modern Penn-
sylvania jurisprudence.
56
Consistent with this four-pronged framework, the Court turned
first to the text of Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution57 and noted its similarity to the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.58 The Court then stated that neither
identical language nor similarity between the federal and state
53. Id. at 894.
54. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 906.
55. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,1038 (1983).
56. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 895.
57. Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides: 'The people shall be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and
seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue
without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant." PA. CONST. art. I, § 8.
58. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 895-96.
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constitutions requires the Pennsylvania courts to follow federal
precedent.
59
The Court then considered the history of Article I, Section 8 and
Pennsylvania's approach to search and seizure cases.60 Noting
that the Pennsylvania Constitution was adopted ten years prior to
the ratification of the United States Constitution, the Court re-
futed the "misconception that state constitutions are somehow
patterned after the United States Constitution. ' 61 The Court also
explained that the probable cause and warrant requirements of
Article I, Section 8 were rooted in Pennsylvania's Constitution of
1776 and were intended to embody a strong notion of privacy and
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
62
Finally, the Court reasoned that the historical record "indicates
that the purpose underlying the exclusionary rule in this Com-
monwealth is quite distinct from the purpose underlying the ex-
clusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment" and thus war-
ranted independent analysis and judgment.
63
In light of the history of Article I, Section 8, the Court declined
to adopt the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, ex-
plaining:
[The Pennsylvania] Constitution has historically been inter-
preted to incorporate a strong right of privacy, and an equally
strong adherence to the requirement of probable cause under
Article I, Section 8. Citizens in this Commonwealth possess
such rights, even where a police officer in "good faith" carry-
ing out his or her duties inadvertently invades the privacy or
circumvents the strictures of probable cause. To adopt a
"good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, we believe,
would virtually emasculate those clear safeguards which have
been carefully developed under the Pennsylvania Constitution
over the past 200 years.
64
59. Id. (citing Tarbert, 535 A.2d at 1043).
60. Id. at 895-99.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 896-97 (citing Sell, 470 A.2d at 467, for the proposition that "the survival of
the language now employed in Article 1, Section 8 through over 200 years of profound
change in other areas demonstrates that the paramount concern for privacy first adopted
as part of our organic law in 1776 continues to enjoy the mandate of the people of this
Commonwealth").
63. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 897.
64. Id. at 899.
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After reaching its conclusion based on the history of the Penn-
sylvania Constitution, the Court then reviewed cases from other
states. 65 The Court recognized that some states chose to adopt the
federal standard articulated in Leon 66 insofar as it was consistent
with a long history of federal exclusionary rule jurisprudence dat-
ing back to Weeks v. United States67 and Mapp v. Ohio.68 Notwith-
standing the fact that Pennsylvania adopted the exclusionary rule
articulated in Mapp,69 the Court disagreed with Leon on the
grounds that it was inconsistent with Pennsylvania's constitu-
tional history and jurisprudence.70
Thus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court joined those states that
rejected the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. 71 In
doing so, the Court made clear that "[a] mere scorecard of those
states which have accepted and rejected Leon is certainly not dis-
positive of the issue in Pennsylvania. However, the logic of cer-
tain of those opinions bears upon our analysis under the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution, particularly given the unique history of Article
I, Section 8. ' 72
Finally, the Court turned to policy considerations in support of
its decision to reject Leon.73 To adopt a "good faith" exception to
the exclusionary rule would contravene Rules 2003, 2005, and
65. Id. at 899-901.
66. Id. at 899-900 (citing Jackson v. State, 722 S.W.2d 831 (Ark. 1987); State v. Brown,
708 S.W.2d 140 (Mo. 1986); Myers v. State, 482 N.E.2d. 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); State v.
Huber, 704 P.2d 1004 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985); Howell v. State, 483 A.2d 780 (Md. Ct. Special
App. 1984); State v. Martin, 487 So.2d 1295 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied 491 So.2d 25 (La.
1986)).
67. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
68. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
69. Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 190 A.2d 304 (Pa. 1963).
70. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 891 ("In Leon, the Supreme Court in 1984 departed from a
long history of exclusionary rule jurisprudence dating back to Weeks v. United States and
Mapp v. Ohio." (citations omitted)).
71. Id. at 900 ("Mhe highest courts of at least four states-New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina and Connecticut-have chosen to reject the "good-faith" exception under
their own constitutions, with more detailed analysis of state constitutional principles.")
(citing State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58 (Conn. 1990); State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820
(N.J. 1987); People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1985); State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553
(N.C. 1988). See also Mason v. State, 534 A.2d 242 (Del. 1987) (rejecting good faith excep-
tion as statutory matter); Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 1985) (same);
Stringer v. State, 491 So.2d 837 (Miss. 1986); State v. Taylor, 763 S.W.2d 756 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1987); State v. Grawein, 367 N.W.2d 816 (Wis. 1985); People v. Sundling, 395 N.W.2d
308 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Herbst, 395 N.W.2d 399, 404 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
(rejecting "good faith" exception under respective state constitutions).
72. Id. at 900.
73. See id. at 901-05.
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2006 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. 74 For in-
stance, the Court noted that Rule 2003, which sets forth the pre-
requisites for the issuance of a warrant,75 "adopts a 'four corners'
requirement, and provides that only evidence contained within the
four corners of the affidavit may be considered to establish prob-
able cause."76 Under this approach, one cannot look beyond the
written warrant to consider statements made by police officers,
even if made in good faith, to determine whether probable cause
existed to support a search and seizure. 77 Therefore, a "good faith"
exception would contradict Pennsylvania's criminal procedure
rules by destroying the contractual approach to the warrant and
probable cause requirements.
In sum, Justice Cappy's opinion for the Court in Edmunds is a
classic example of judicial federalism that, in addition to joining
eight other states in eschewing Leon's "good faith" exception to the
exclusionary rule, broke new ground with its four-part framework
for state courts to apply in interpreting their respective constitu-
tions independent of the Supreme Court's decisions interpreting
the United States Constitution. 78
4. The Edmunds Dissent
Justice Cappy's opinion for the Court in Edmunds was not
unanimous.7 9 As he did in Sell, Justice McDermott offered a vig-
74. Id. (stating that "such a rule would effectively negate the judicially created man-
date reflected in the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, in Rules 2003, 2005, and
2006.").
75. Pa. R. Crim. P. 2003 states, in pertinent part:
(a) No search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by one or more
affidavits sworn to before the issuing authority. The issuing authority, in determin-
ing whether probable cause has been established, may not consider any evidence out-
side the affidavits.
(b) At any hearing on a motion for the return or suppression of evidence, or for sup-
pression of the fruits of evidence, obtained pursuant to a search warrant, no evidence
shall be admissible to establish probable cause other than the affidavits provided for
in paragraph (a).
PA. R. CRIM. P. 2003.
76. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 901 (citing Commonwealth v. Milliken, 300 A.2d 78 (Pa.
1973)).
77. Id. at 901 n.12 ("When Rules 2005 and 2006 are read in conjunction with Rule
2003, there is absolutely no question that oral statements of the police officer not in writ-
ing-of the sort made in the instant case by Trooper Deise-may not be considered in de-
termining whether probable cause has been established.").
78. See id. at 900.
79. Id. at 906.
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orous dissent in Edmunds.80 Justice McDermott began by conced-
ing the power of Pennsylvania courts "to give more than that al-
lowed under Federal Constitutional interpretation. 81 As a pru-
dential matter, however, Justice McDermott saw no reason to de-
part from the rationale of the United States Supreme Court.
82
Indeed, he argued that the "good faith" exception of Leon was
firmly grounded in Pennsylvania jurisprudence.8 3
Justice McDermott also criticized the Edmunds majority for de-
parting from the Court's consistent adherence to federal applica-
tions of the exclusionary rule, which, in his view, had been ex-
panded well beyond instances where law enforcement authorities
were guilty of misconduct.8 4 He argued that Leon did not, as the
majority suggested, "open the gates to unauthorized search" or
"dissolve the need for probable cause. '8 5 Rather, the case merely
shifted the responsibility for determining probable cause to a neu-
tral magistrate, absolving the police of technical mistakes.8 6 Ap-
plying this view to the facts of Edmunds, exclusion of evidence
obtained in a reasonable search solely because a date or time was
not specified with exactitude in a warrant was "practiced absurd-
ity. 8 7 To Justice McDermott, Leon reiterated, and Pennsylvania
jurisprudence supported, the well-established principle that the
exclusionary rule was adopted to deter police misconduct.88
Underlying the dissent is the presumption that Pennsylvania
has some obligation to strongly consider-if not follow without
question-the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of the United
80. See id. at 906-09 (McDermott, J., dissenting). Justice Papadakos endorsed Justice
McDermott's dissenting opinion but was constrained to concur in the result because of the
clear mandate of Pa. R. Crim. P. 2003(a), which he interpreted to compel the "absurd" re-
sult that evidence must be excluded despite the absence of police misconduct. Id. at 906
(Papadakos, J., concurring in result).
81. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 908 (citing Sell, 470 A.2d at 467).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 907 (McDermott, J., dissenting) (citing Bosurgi, 190 A.2d 304, in support
of his claim that "[uintil this day we have dutifully followed the canons of the Fourth
Amendment prescribed by the Supreme Court of the United States through hundreds of
cases. We accepted, as we must, their rationale that police procedures had overstepped
constitutional bounds and we imposed the sanction of suppression to dissuade illegal
search.") (emphasis added).
85. Id.
86. Edmunds, 586 A.2d at 907.
87. Id. at 907.
88. Id. at 907-08. Justice McDermott stated, "[1]ikewise, we have approved the sup-
pression of evidence only where it will have the benefit of deterring similar police miscon-
duct in the future." Id. at 907-08 (citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Corley, 491 A.2d 829,




States Supreme Court.8 9 Although Justice McDermott dissented
in Sell, his dissent in Edmunds echoed the Sell majority's "compel-
ling interest" argument. In neither Sell nor Edmunds could Jus-
tice McDermott find any justifiable reason to reject, on state con-
stitutional grounds, the United States Supreme Court's search
and seizure jurisprudence. In his view, not only should federal
jurisprudence serve as a benchmark for interpreting correspond-
ing provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution, but in practice,
Pennsylvania had historically followed the federal case law in de-
veloping its state constitutional law, particularly with respect to
the exclusionary rule.90
C. The Effect of Edmunds on Pennsylvania Jurisprudence
It is worth noting at the outset that Pennsylvania's foray into
new judicial federalism has prompted legitimate criticism. 91 Some
commentators have noted that Pennsylvania has been most active
in departing from Supreme Court precedent in search and seizure
cases arising under Article I, Section 8, while adhering to federal
interpretations in most other areas of state constitutional law,
including the Pennsylvania Constitution's analogues to the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments.92 This inconsistency raises the question
of whether Pennsylvania is committed to a rigorous body of inde-
pendent state constitutional law.93 The critics posited that the
episodic use of the Edmunds framework indicated that "develop-
ment of state constitutional law in this area has continued to be
89. See id. at 908. Justice McDermott stated, "[tihe Supreme Court of the
United States is a world landmark for the protection of constitutional rights. What they
require we enforce; what they allow we ought not deter except upon clear evidence of posi-
tive need." Id. at 909.
90. See id. at 907-09.
91. See Robert F. Williams, Methodological Problems in Enforcing State Constitutional
Rights, 3 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 143, 169 (1986-87) (cautioning against overly rigid application
by states of criteria in performing state constitutional interpretation); James A. Gardner,
The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761 (1992); Francis
Barry McCarthy, Counterfeit Interpretations of State Constitutions in Criminal Procedure,
58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 79 (2007).
92. Robert Williams, A "ow of Shadows" Pennsylvania's Misguided Lockstep Ap-
proach to Its State Constitutional Equality Doctrine, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 343 (1993); Ken
Gormley, The Pennsylvania Constitution after Edmunds, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 55 (1993);
Robert Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-by-Case
Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping?. 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499 (20050.
93. Other critics have pointed to the fact that the state constitutional search and sei-
zure doctrine is "intermittent" and that new judicial federalism is but a "selective revolt
against certain portions of search and seizure law." Barry Latzer, STATE CONST. CRIM. LAW




little more than a series of reactions to decisions of the United
States Supreme Court."94 Indeed, even the cases that ostensibly
depart from federal law do so in "pale imitationa of the decisions
and of the values and the methods of analysis of the [Supreme
Court]. ' 95  Justice McDermott's dissenting opinions in Sell and
Edmunds echoed this perspective.
However apt these criticisms may be, Justice Cappy anticipated
them and endeavored to bring more uniformity to Pennsylvania
state constitutional law by designing and implementing the four-
part framework in Edmunds.96 The four-part framework remains
the interpretive standard by which to decide Pennsylvania cases
involving rights based on independent state grounds.97 Interest-
ingly, however, Edmunds has not been applied uniformly to every
case triggering issues of state constitutional interpretation, as dis-
cussed below.
For example, a few years after Edmunds, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court stated in Commonwealth v. White9" that the Ed-
munds analysis is not mandatory, and that a party's claim should
not be dismissed for failing to follow the precise format set forth in
Edmunds.99 That is to say, the White majority read Edmunds to
be a command to litigants, not to courts, requiring them to include
an Edmunds analysis when bringing claims under the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution. 10 0 As a result, cases such as White have clari-
94. Id. at 90; see also Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy
of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353, 388-89
(1984).
95. Id.
96. Commonwealth v. Rekasie, 778 A.2d 624 (Pa. 2001) (acknowledging that "[t]he
analytical framework, which this court has applied in considering privacy expectations
recognized [by] the Pennsylvania Constitution, has been less than clear."); see also Ken
Gormley, The Pennsylvania Constitution After Edmunds, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 55, 66
(1993).
97. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 626 A.2d 537, 541 (Pa. 1993); United Artists
Theater Cir., Inc. v. City of Phila., 635 A.2d 612, 615 (Pa. 1993); Montayne v. Wissahickon
School Dist., 327 F. Supp. 2d 510 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
98. 669 A.2d 896 (Pa. 1995).
99. White, 669 A.2d at 899; see also Commonwealth v. Strader, 931 A.2d 630, 633 (Pa.
2007) (analyzing under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and de-
clining to perform Edmunds analysis where appellant failed to cite the Edmunds factors).
100. Id. Justices Castille and Montemuro did not share this view. They read Edmunds
to require that courts independently perform an Edmunds analysis in ruling on state con-
stitutional claims. See, e.g., Jubilerer v. Rendell, 953 A.2d 514, 524 n.10 (Pa. 2008); Com-
monwealth v. Russo, 934 A.2d 1199, 1205-10 (Pa. 2007); Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 812 A.2d
591, 603 (Pa. 2002); Commonwealth v. Glass, 754 A.2d 655, 661 & n.8 (Pa. 2000); Com-
monwealth v. Williams, 692 A.2d 1031, 1038 (Pa. 1997); Commonwealth v. Rogers, 849
A.2d 1185, 1197 & nn.6-7 (Pa. 2004) (Castille, J., concurring); White, 669 A.2d at 910 (Pa.
1995) (Castille, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Perry, 798 A.2d 697, 714 n.6 (Pa. 2002)
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fled the Edmunds analysis. It is not a mandatory test; rather, it is
a rule for litigants to follow and a guidepost for courts in interpret-
ing state constitutional provisions.10' Pennsylvania courts may, of
course, choose to decide a case without engaging in an Edmunds
analysis where a state constitutional issue was raised but not
briefed.102
The lack of a clear mandate to apply the Edmunds analysis to
cases arising under the Pennsylvania Constitution has resulted in
somewhat inconsistent approaches by Pennsylvania courts. A
survey of cases decided after Edmunds in which the Pennsylvania
courts confronted matters of state constitutional interpretation
revealed the following six categories:
1. Cases that do not apply Edmunds but cite to it generally for
the unremarkable notion that Pennsylvania may depart from
federal standards in applying the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion 0
3
2. Cases that cite Edmunds merely for its holding that Penn-
sylvania does not recognize a "good-faith" exception to the ex-
clusionary rule
10 4
3. Cases that apply the Edmunds analysis and reach a result
consistent with the corresponding federal standard10 5
(Castille, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Shaw, 770 A.2d 295, 305 (Pa. 2001) (Castille,
J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 910 (Castille, J., dissenting). But see Sam, 952 A.2d at 585 (Pa. 2008) ("As
appellee's counsel notes, Edmunds directs advocates to brief and analyze the following four
factors when litigating a claim that state constitutional doctrine should depart from the
applicable federal standard...").
102. See generally Ken Gormley et al., THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION: A TREATISE
ON RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES (Ken Gormley ed., 2004); see also Commonwealth v. Swinehart,
664 A.2d 957, 969 (Pa. 1995) (applying Edmunds factors but finding that use and derivative
use immunity provided in 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5947 is consistent with the Pennsylvania
constitutional privilege against compelled self-incrimination found in Article I, Section 9);
Commonwealth v. Crouse, 729 A.2d 588, 594 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (applying Edmunds
factors but adopting federal standard to hold that the Pennsylvania Constitution permits a
.protective sweep" of a private home pursuant to a valid arrest warrant).
103. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Snyder, 953 A.2d 396 (Pa. 2009); Smolow v. Hafer, 959
A.2d 298, 300 n.6 (Pa. 2008).
104. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Arnold, 932 A.2d 143, 148 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007); Com-
monwealth v. Pratt, 930 A.2d 561 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007); Jones v. City of Phila., 890 A.2d
1188, 1194-99 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006).
105. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gray, 896 A.2d 601, 606 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (inter-
preting the Pennsylvania Constitution to require the same standard for Terry stops as
applied under federal law); Russo, 934 A.2d 1199 (undertaking an independent Edmunds
analysis to conclude that the Fourth Amendment's open fields doctrine, as enunciated by
the Supreme Court, applies equally under search and seizure provision of the Pennsylvania
Constitution. Notably, Justice Cappy dissented, performing a separate Edmunds analysis
519
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4. Cases that apply Edmunds to find broader protections un-
der the Pennsylvania Constitution than those available under
the United States Constitution 10 6
5. Cases that do not apply Edmunds but nonetheless depart
from the corresponding federal standard to find broader pro-
tections under the Pennsylvania Constitution than those pur-
suant to the United States Constitution
10 7
6. Cases that apply the corresponding federal standard to a
matter of state constitutional law as a default, with little or
no mention of the Edmunds factors 08
Among these six categories of cases, the first four represent the
predictable outgrowth of a landmark decision such as Edmunds.
The latter two categories of cases, which do not apply Edmunds,
make it difficult to predict the extent to which Edmunds will
stand the test of time. In the meantime, these two categories are
likely to present difficulties for counsel and the Pennsylvania
courts.
The cases that depart from Edmunds' methodology and revert to
an analysis that relies on the federal standard as the baseline call
to argue that the Pennsylvania Constitution affords more protection than the federal Con-
stitution). Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has made progress in developing its
own body of state constitutional law, particularly in the context of search and seizure and
criminal procedure, it has been reluctant to stray from federal standards in other contexts.
For example, in United Artists' Theater Circuit, Inc., v. City of Philadelphia, 635 A.2d 612,
616 (Pa. 1993), the Court upheld a Philadelphia historic landmark ordinance, holding that
the takings clause in the Pennsylvania Constitution did not provide more extensive protec-
tions than those offered by the United States Constitution. Notably, however, the Court
applied the Edmunds factors to uphold the federal standard. United Artists, 635 A.2d at
615-16.
106. See, e.g., Hughes v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2007 WL 2874849 (W.D. Pa. 2007)
(involving an insurance contract dispute under Pennsylvania law, in which federal court
recognized and applied the Edmunds methodology).
107. See, e.g., Shaw, 770 A.2d 295 (holding that the Pennsylvania Constitution pre-
cluded police from obtaining, for purposes of possible prosecution, results of a blood alcohol
test performed by emergency room personnel for independent medical purposes, where
police lacked search warrant and where no exigent circumstances existed); Commonwealth
v. Luv, 735 A.2d 87 (Pa. 1999) (relying on Labron and White); see also Commonwealth v.
McCree, 924 A.2d 621, 629 (Pa. 2007); Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 935 A.2d 1275 (Pa.
2007).
108. See, e.g., Perry, 798 A.2d 697; Rogers, 849 A.2d 1185. Neither of these cases utilizes
the Edmunds analysis, but they illustrate the disagreement that developed between Jus-
tices Cappy and Castille over new judicial federalism in Pennsylvania. Justice Cappy con-
sistently applied an independent analysis of the Pennsylvania Constitution, sometimes
without regard to the federal analysis of the United States Constitution. Chief Justice
Castille, by contrast, tied his analyses to the federal jurisprudence absent a compelling
reason to reach a different result under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
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into question Pennsylvania's commitment to new judicial federal-
ism, notwithstanding Justice Cappy's opinion in Edmunds. Simi-
larly, cases that do not apply Edmunds, but nonetheless depart
from the corresponding federal standard to find broader protec-
tions under the Pennsylvania Constitution than those offered by
the United States Constitution, create some doctrinal confusion to
the extent that these decisions ignore Edmunds in favor of the
"compelling interest" test of Sell.
For example, Pennsylvania has departed from the federal stan-
dard in the context of the automobile exception to the warrant re-
quirement. The United States Supreme Court has long held that
warrantless vehicle searches are permissible where probable
cause exists. 10 9 Under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, however, warrantless vehicle searches "must be ac-
companied not only by probable cause, but also by exigent circum-
stances beyond mere mobility; one without the other is insuffi-
cient."110
Despite their clear departure from the federal standard, none of
the Pennsylvania cases involving the automobile exception deci-
sions relied on Edmunds. Accordingly, these decisions have raised
eyebrows among judges and legal scholars. Even Chief Justice
Castille critcized these decisions for not following some coherent
"Edmunds-style state constitutional analysis or explanation for
that departure from perfectly reasonable federal authority."' 1
Indeed, in a case that was remanded to the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court by the United States Supreme Court after it dis-
agreed with Pennsylvania's federal constitutional analysis, Justice
Castille used an Edmunds analysis to hold that Article I, Section 7
of the Pennsylvania Constitution offered greater protection than
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 1 2 In
Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie (Pap's II), 113 Chief Justice Castille held
109. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 149 (1925).
110. Luv, 735 A.2d at 93 (relying on Labron and White, 669 A.2d at 899); see also
McCree, 924 A.2d at 629; Hernandez, 935 A.2d at 1280.
111. Hernandez, 935 A.2d at 1286-87 (Castille, J., concurring in result).
112. See Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 812 A.2d 591 (Pa. 2002) (Pap's II). Chief Justice
Cappy wrote Pap's I, in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a local ordinance
that banned nude dancing violated the First Amendment. Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 719
A.2d 273 (Pa. 1998) (Pap's I). While Justice Cappy noted that the Court was not bound by
federal precedent, it found the precedent persuasive in the absence of controlling federal
and Pennsylvania precedent. Pap's I, 719 A.2d at 278-80. Pap's I went up to the Supreme
Court (City of Erie v. Pap's A. M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000)), which overturned the decision and
remanded.
113. 812 A.2d 591 (Pa. 2002).
Summer 2009
Duquesne Law Review
that a city ordinance prohibiting nude dancing violated Article I,
Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution because it intended to
prohibit a protected expressive and communicative activity. 11
4
In doing so, Chief Justice Castille noted Pennsylvania's history
and experience protecting speech and expression. 1 5 Neither party
disagreed that Pennsylvania afforded more protection for speech
than the federal courts, nor that an Edmunds analysis was appro-
priate." 6 The argument turned on how far such protection would
extend, and both litigants used the Edmunds factors to craft their
arguments. 1 7 Chief Justice Castille emphasized the importance
of the Edmunds model to the creation of a coherent and ascertain-
able standard to govern future analysis under Article I, Section
7.118
Thus, Chief Justice Castille acknowledged the potential for de-
parture from federal law, especially in light of Edmunds."9 For
him, such a departure must be justified by more than a court's
mere disagreement with federal authority. 20 At the same time,
Chief Justice Castille noted recently that the Edmunds factors
would not be applied to state constitutional claims that have no
federal analogue.
121
In light of the varying treatment of the Edmunds decision, one
cannot say unequivocally that Pennsylvania always will evaluate
the state constitutional claim first and then proceed to evaluate
the federal constitutional claim only in the absence of a state con-
stitutional right (i.e., the primacy approach). Nor can one say that
Pennsylvania will look to the United States Constitution first and
only engage in state constitutional analysis when there is no fed-
eral right (i.e., the interstitial approach). Nor will Pennsylvania
categorically engage in both a state constitutional analysis and an
evaluation of the claim under federal law (i.e., the dual sovereignty
approach). Finally, Pennsylvania obviously has eschewed a cate-
gorical lockstep approach, which, as the name suggests, means
that the state constitutional interpretation mirrors federal consti-
114. Id. at 608.
115. Id. at 601.
116. Id. at 602.
117. Id.
118. Pap's II, 812 A.2d at 603.
119. Id. at 603-04.
120. Id. at 604.
121. Jubelirer, 953 A.2d at 524.
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tutional interpretation. 122 Unable to place Pennsylvania state con-
stitutional jurisprudence neatly into one of these categories, Pro-
fessor and Interim Dean Ken Gormley of Duquesne Law School
has called Pennsylvania's approach to state constitutional inter-
pretation "selective primacy."'123 According to Gormley, Pennsyl-
vania has engaged in a "mish-mash" of the three non-lockstep ap-
proaches. 1
24
Although the application of the Edmunds framework has been
inconsistent at times and the result it yields varies from jurist to
jurist, it has been critical to the development of new judicial fed-
eralism in Pennsylvania. Notwithstanding the internal inconsis-
tencies, Pennsylvania appears to remain committed to the devel-
opment of independent state constitutional jurisprudence.
It may be too soon to comment with any certainty on patterns
emerging in the post-Edmunds case law, given that Pennsylvania
courts are still developing their approaches to state constitutional
interpretation. Nevertheless, it is already clear that Edmunds
profoundly affected Pennsylvania jurisprudence by establishing a
framework for lawyers and courts to demonstrate that they have
engaged in an independent state constitutional analysis pursuant
to Michigan v. Long.
Indeed, the Edmunds opinion was Pennsylvania's first attempt
to establish a formulaic approach to interpreting the Pennsylvania
Constitution. Despite its less-than-uniform treatment, the fact
remains that, regardless of whether one is a proponent or critic of
new judicial federalism, Edmunds established a method of state
constitutional interpretation that remains the focal point as Penn-
sylvania continues to develop its state constitutional jurispru-
dence.
D. The Effect of Edmunds on the Jurisprudence of Other States
The significance of Justice Cappy's opinion in Edmunds extends
well beyond the borders of Pennsylvania. Unsurprisingly, Ed-
munds figures prominently in state cases considering whether to
adopt the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. Most of
the post-1991 cases that rejected the "good faith" exception cited to
122. See Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Methodology in Search and Seizure
Cases, 77 MISS. L. J. 225, 250 (2007).
123. Gormley, The Pennsylvania Constitution After Edmunds, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. at
70-75.
124. Id. at 73.
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Edmunds as persuasive authority. 125 Even among those courts
that chose to follow the federal standard and adopt the "good
faith" exception, many addressed Justice Cappy's opinion in Ed-
munds.
Perhaps more noteworthy is Edmunds' contribution to "new fed-
eralism" generally. Virtually all scholarship published on the sub-
ject after 1991 has either discussed or at least mentioned Ed-
munds.1 26 Moreover, as noted previously, state courts are increas-
ingly relying on their own constitutions to provide broader protec-
tion for individual rights, independent of those afforded by the
United States Constitution. Edmunds is often discussed by state
courts in this context.
Various state supreme courts-most notably Delaware, Ken-
tucky, Michigan, and Wyoming-found Edmunds particularly in-
fluential and have relied on it to craft virtually identical method-
ologies for interpreting their respective state constitutions.1 27
Likewise, the Minnesota Supreme Court established similar fac-
tors for litigants to consider when bringing claims under the Min-
nesota Constitution.1 2 In doing so, the Minnesota Supreme Court
125. See, e.g., People v. Camarella, 818 P.2d 63 (Cal. 1991); State v. Gutierrez, 863 P.2d
1052 (N.M. 1993); State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553 (N.C. 1988); State v. Canelo, 653 A.2d
1097 (N.H. 1995) (adopting the reasoning of the Edmunds majority opinion); State v. Lopez,
896 P.2d 889, 902 (Haw. 1995); State v. Matsunaga, 920 P.2d 376 (Haw. Ct. App. 1996);
State v. Hill, 690 So.2d 1201 (Ala. 1996); People v. Krueger, 675 N.E.2d 604 (111. 1996);
State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660 (Idaho 1992).
126. See, e.g., Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1992) (discussing emerging new
federalism jurisprudence nationwide).
127. See Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 856, 864-65 (Del. 1999) (looking to Edmunds to estab-
lish a nonexclusive list of factors that includes textual language, legislative history, preex-
isting state law, structural differences, matters of particular state interest or local concern,
state traditions, and public attitudes); see also Ortiz v. State, 869 A.2d 285, 291 n.4 (Del.
2005) (citing to Edmunds and Jones and stating that "[t]he proper presentation of an al-
leged violation of the Delaware Constitution should include a discussion and analysis of one
or more of the criteria set forth in Jones or other applicable criteria." ); Dorsey v. State, 761
A.2d 807 (Del. 2000); People v. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. 1992) (applying Edmunds to
hold that under Michigan's Constitution: (1) search of luggage placed in automobile by
passenger was valid pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement; but
(2) mandatory penalty of life imprisonment without possibility of parole violated "cruel or
unusual" punishment prohibition; and (3) proper remedy was to strike down the prohibition
on parole); Saldana v. State, 846 P.2d 604 (Wyo. 1993) (looking to other states, including
Pennsylvania, for guidance in shaping its own interpretive methodology).
128. Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 829 (Minn. 2005) ("Thus, we suggest that, as a
general rule, there are certain factors that litigants should consider when addressing an
issue that may implicate a separate independent analysis under the Minnesota Constitu-
tion. The following nonexclusive list of factors should prove useful: (1) the text of the state
Constitution, (2) the history of the state constitutional provision, (3) relevant state case
law, (4) the text of any counterpart in the U.S. Constitution, (5) related federal precedent
and relevant case law from other states that have addressed identical or substantially
similar constitutional language, (6) policy considerations, including unique, distinct, or
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expressly noted the importance of Edmunds and acknowledged
Justice Cappy's contribution. 129
Of course, not all states have followed Edmunds. The New Mex-
ico Supreme Court, for example, adopted its own version of an in-
terstitial approach to state constitutional interpretation. 130 While
not entirely deferential to federal precedent, New Mexico's ap-
proach is more deferential to federal precedent than the Edmunds
approach. 131 Under New Mexico's approach, if a litigant asserts a
constitutional right that state courts have analyzed using federal
precedent, federal precedent will be applied. 132 If, on the other
hand, no precedent exists with regard to a particular constitu-
tional claim, the litigant must bring the claim as a state constitu-
tional claim, and the court will perform an independent analy-
sis.1
33
The New Mexico Supreme Court expressly noted Edmunds and
the fact that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was one of several
state courts to have "outlined a number of criteria that trial coun-
sel in New Mexico might profitably consult in framing state con-
stitutional arguments."'134 However, it ultimately concluded that
litigants were not required to raise, in the trial court, specific cri-
teria for departing from federal interpretation of the United States
Constitution. 
13
Other states have, at times, opted for the lockstep approach.
Using this approach, state courts apply the federal standard as
the default rule in interpreting corresponding state provisions and
acknowledge the potential for departure from the federal stan-
dard, but only in exceptional circumstances when some compelling
reason warrants it.136
peculiar issues of state and local concern, and (7) the applicability of the foregoing factors
within the context of the modern scheme of state jurisprudence.").
129. Id. at 829 n.12.
130. State v. Gomez, 932 P.2d 1, 7-8 (N.M. 1997).
131. Id. For a thorough discussion of the interstitial approach to state constitutional
interpretation, see the New Jersey Supreme Court's analysis in State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d
952, 964 (N.J. 1982). See also Gormley, The Pennsylvania Constitution After Edmunds, 3
WIDENER J. PUB. L. at 70-75, for a discussion of the interstitial approach, as distinguished
from the primacy approach, and Pennsylvania's selective primacy approach.
132. Gomez, 932 P.2d at 8.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 8 n.3.
135. Id.
136. Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-
by-Case Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499, 1506-09
(2005) (discussing the lockstep approach and advocating that states perform a "reflective
adoption" of federal law-deciding to follow Fourth Amendment holdings, without indicat-
ing that in the future, in other cases, the same approach will be followed).
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For example, the North Dakota Supreme Court applied the fed-
eral standard to search and seizure cases, but did so by engaging
in an Edmunds analysis and by distinguishing the North Dakota
Constitution from the Pennsylvania Constitution. 137  The Ohio
Supreme Court-after citing Edmunds and recognizing that it had
the power to interpret the Ohio Constitution more expansively
than the United States Constitution-concluded "that protections
afforded by the Ohio Constitution are coextensive with those pro-
vided by the United States Constitution."'138 As seen with Penn-
sylvania's application of Edmunds, the states that purportedly
follow a lockstep approach also do so inconsistently at times.
Whatever approach the states have adopted in evaluating their
respective constitutions, one thing is abundantly clear: During
and after the Burger Era, numerous states recognized their power
to depart from federal interpretations of the United States Consti-
tution. 139 Of the many cases where the courts have exercised that
power, Edmunds played a seminal role in the development of new
judicial federalism.
Not only did Edmunds set a standard for interpretation and
analysis of the Pennsylvania Constitution, but it also offered a
137. State v. Herrick, 588 N.W.2d 847, 853 (N.D. 1999) ("[T]he independent history of
Pennsylvania's declared right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was an
important factor in the Edmunds reasoning.. . North Dakota precedent does not contain
such clear guidance.").
138. State v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762, 766 (Ohio 1997); see also State v. Gustafson,
668 N.E.2d 435, 441 (Ohio 1996) (Double Jeopardy Clauses coextensive in their protec-
tions); Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco, 626 N.E.2d 59, 65 (Ohio 1994) (First Amendment Free
Speech Clauses coextensive in their protections).
139. Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 F.2d 1039, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding a
restraining order overbroad under the California Constitution), overruled by L.A. Alliance
for Survival v. City of L.A., 993 P.2d 334 (Cal. 2000); Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. v.
Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1990) (looking to federal law only after finding no
inverse condemnation under the state constitution); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 773 P.2d 455, 461 (Ariz. 1989); In re T.W., 551 So.2d 1186, 1190
(Fla. 1989); O'Neill v. Oakgrove Constr., 523 N.E.2d 277, 282 (N.Y. 1988); State v. Jewett,
500 A.2d 233, 238 (Vt. 1985) (federal law considered but required briefing of the state con-
stitutional issue before the case could be decided); State v. Koppel, 499 A.2d 977, 979 (N.H.
1985); State v. Beno, 341 N.W.2d 668 (Wis. 1984) (following the state constitution although
recognizing the existence of a closely corresponding federal Speech and Debate Clause
found in U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 1); People v. Rolfingsmeyer, 461 N.E.2d 410, 413-15 (Ill.
1984); State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 959 (N.J. 1982); Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 513-15
(Alaska 1975); Burrows v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 529 P.2d 590 (Cal.
1975); State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) (federal law was examined but rejected
as inadequate); City of Hillsboro v. Purcell, 761 P.2d 510 (Or. 1988) (discussing federal law
but then deciding the case under the state constitution), overruled by State v. Anderson,
910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1996); Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 759 P.2d 1358,
1362-63 (Colo. 1988) (reversing the lower court for relying on federal law when the state
constitution contained unique provisions).
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methodology for other state courts to emulate and build upon as
they experiment with new judicial federalism. By articulating a
clear methodology, Edmunds has opened the door to further de-
velopment of state constitutional law.
IV. CONCLUSION
During his seventeen years of service on the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, Justice Ralph Cappy authored many opinions of sig-
nificance. Although his leadership and influence grew during his
tenure, especially after he became Chief Justice, the passage of
time may confirm that his most influential opinion was issued af-
ter only one year on the Court. Edmunds remains to this day an
important decision that is likely to be the subject of debate and
discussion in Pennsylvania and the nation for years to come.

